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Abstract
This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a job-search process
when diﬀerent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have diﬀerent degrees of
impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution
is a decreasing function of the discount factor (Cysne 2004, 2006), I show that the Lorenz
curve and the between-cohort Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality can be easily derived
in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage oﬀers and the
distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some insights into how much
income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability
of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not ﬁnd a job oﬀer each
period.
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Resumo
Este trabalho investiga a desigualdade de renda salarial gerada por um modelo usual
de procura de trabalho (job search), quando se admite que diferentes coortes (cohorts)
de trabalhadores tˆ em diferentes graus de impaciˆ encia (desconto intertemporal). Usando
fortemente o fato (provado em Cysne (2004, 2006)) de que o sal´ ario m´ edio em cada coorte ´ e
fun¸ c˜ ao crescente do fator de desconto intertemporal, o trabalho mostra que o coeﬁciente de
Gini pode ser facilmente calculado, e como calcul´ a-lo. Usando uma distribui¸ c˜ ao Beta para
o coeﬁciente de desconto entre coortes, o trabalho provˆ e um exemplo que d´ a uma medida
quantitativa de quanto se pode gerar em termos de desigualdade usando a heterogeneidade
de fatores de desconto.
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1. Introduction
A condition for a stochastic dynamic model to be of some use in the
understanding of income distribution is that it delivers an endogenous distribution
of incomes. Within this class of models, job-search models are certainly among
the simplest. In this case, the endogenous distribution is given by the invariant
distribution of wages in the economy generated by the rules deﬁning the job search.
A nice feature of studying income inequality in this category of models is that, as
we shall see, the Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality can be parameterized in
terms of some speciﬁc characteristics of the job market, such as the probability of
unemployment and the probability that an unemployed worker ﬁnds no job oﬀer
in a certain period.
Pissarides (1974) uses a job-search model to compare the income distribution 1
of two cohorts 2 with diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion. This author argues that
cohorts with higher risk aversion will have a lower reservation wage and, because
the wages of employed workers will have a greater range, the income distribution
will be worse.
Pissarides does not explicit derive the stationary distribution generated by the
interactions of the transition functions implicit in his model. Moreover, his work
concentrates only on comparing (between two cohorts) within-cohort inequalities,
not formally deriving a measure of inequality among cohorts.
In this work I complement Pissaride’s analysis by pursuing answers to three
diﬀerent questions. First, instead of dealing with heterogenous degrees of risk
aversion, I allow consumers in diﬀerent cohorts to have diﬀerent discount-factor
parameters. Second, in each cohort I concentrate the analysis on the invariant
Markovian distribution of all wages that a representative has along his (supposedly
inﬁnite) life time. Third, I analyze inequality among cohorts, rather than within
cohorts.
The inequality among cohorts is generated by the fact that more patient workers
have higher reservation wages and higher average wages as well (see Cysne (2004,
2006) for a demonstration of this fact).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is used for the presentation of the
general model, fully characterizing the job-search problem within a cohort. Section
3 is dedicated to the derivation of the invariant-distribution between-cohort Gini
coeﬃcient of income inequality. Section 4 is used to make quantitative assessments
of the model, based on an example with arbitrary measures of the wage oﬀers
within cohorts and of the distribution of discount factors among cohorts. Section
5 concludes.
1 More rigorously, we are dealing here with wage inequality. However, transfers and capital income
usually represent only a small fraction of most households’ total income. For the United States, for
instance, following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), transfers and capital income account
in average for only around 28% of the total income of the households surveyed. This percentage tends
to be even lower in developing countries.
2 In this work, a cohort is deﬁned as a group of homogenous workers/consumers.
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2. The Model
The basic model presented here is the same as the one presented in Cysne (2004,
2006), which in turn draws on Stokey and Lucas’s (1989) version of McCall’s (1970)
model. The givens of the model, a partial-equilibrium one, 3 are the distribution
of wage oﬀers (the same for all workers and along all cohorts), the distribution of
the discount-factor parameter among cohorts of workers, the probability of layoﬀs
and the probability that, each period, the worker does not get any job oﬀer next
period.




, B[0,1), standing for the borelians in
[0,1) and L for the Lebesgue measure, consider a continuum of cohorts, indexed
by j, each cohort with a large number of homogenous workers. Cohorts diﬀer only
in terms of their discount-factor parameter. The distribution of discount factors
βj ∈ [0,1) along these cohorts is determined by:
βj = H−1(j) , H′(.) > 0 (1)
In equation (1), j has a uniform distribution in [0,1) and H stands for a
cumulative probability distribution of a random variable taking values in [0,1). The
isomorphism (1) allows us to put diﬀerent probability measures “m” in the space
where the discount-factor parameters take value (also ([0,1),B[0,1))). For instance,
if H is the cumulative distribution function of a Beta (s,v) random variable, then
the β′
js will be distributed as a Beta (s,v). Note that having H′(.) > 0 allows us
to identify each cohort j with its discount-factor parameter βj.





generic sample space and, in this measurable space, the measure q induced by the





by F(t) the distribution function that (q −a.e. -uniquely) determines the measure
q : F(t) = p(w ≤ t).
By assumption, in each cohort, there are two states regarding the consumer’s
optimization problem: w and 0. State “w” corresponds to a job oﬀer of w at hand,
and state “0” to no job oﬀer. In state w the worker can accept or turn down the
oﬀer. If he accepts it, by assumption he stays employed with that wage till he is
laid oﬀ (which happens with probability θ). If he does not accept the oﬀer or if he
gets no oﬀer, he remains in state 0. Being in state zero the only thing he can do is
wait again for a job oﬀer next period, which happens with probability (1−α). The
individual is not allowed to search while in his job. The job oﬀers are drawn from
[0,D] according to the measure q. q is known by all workers in all cohorts. Workers
are not allowed to borrow or to lend. Their consumption ct is equal to their income
wt in each period. Consumers in cohort j maximize the expected present value of
3 The reader interested in a job-search model with a more general-equilibrium ﬂavour, including
endogenous creation and destruction of jobs, can refer to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).






. From now on I will only use the index j when
necessary.
With v(w) stating for the value function, ¯ w, the reservation wage is determined
by Cysne (2004, 2006):
¯ w =
β(1 − α)
1 − β(1 − θ)
 
[ ¯ w,D]
(w′ − ¯ w)dF(w′) (2)
Following the analysis in Stokey et al. (1989), c. 10, which displays the particular
case in which α = 0, and equivalently to Cysne (2004, 2006), the reservation
wage ¯ w(j) divides [0,D] into two regions: the acceptance region A(β) = [ ¯ w(β),D]
and the non-acceptance region Ac(β) = [0, ¯ w(β)]. Consider a new measure λt in
([0,D],B[0,D]), representing the eﬀective wage of workers of a certain cohort j (the
j is omitted), in period t. Note that A and Ac depend on the value of β.
The rules of the optimization followed by the worker deﬁne a transition function
P : [0,D] × B[0,D] → [0,1] of wage oﬀers. If the current state (given by the wage
oﬀer) is w ∈ Ac, the probability of having an oﬀer next period in any borelian
B ⊂ [0,D] is given by (1 − α)q(B) + α, if 0 ∈ B, and (1 − α)q(B) if 0 / ∈ B.
Alternatively, if the current state is w ∈ A, the worker can only lose his job (with
probability θ) or keep the same wage next period. Therefore, with probability zero
he will have a wage next period in a borelian B that does not contain either 0
or w. If the borelian B contains 0, but not w, or w but not zero, the transition
probabilities are, respectively, θ and 1−θ. If it contains both, since these are disjoint
events (because 0 / ∈ A), P(w,B) = 1.
A worker will be oﬀered a wage in the acceptance region A in period t + 1 if
either she already had this wage in A in period t and is not laid oﬀ or if she was
unemployed, receives a wage oﬀer, and this wage oﬀer falls in A. Formally:
λt+1(A) = λt(A)(1 − θ) + λt(Ac)(1 − α)q(A) (3)
Taking limits, 4 this leads to the following invariant measure of the acceptance
region A (λ = limt→∞ λt):
λ(A) =
(1 − α)q(A)
θ + (1 − α)q(A)
(4)
Since A ∪ Ac = [0,D] and A ∩ Ac = φ:
λ(Ac) = 1 − λ(A) =
θ
θ + (1 − α)q(A)
(5)
4 It is easy to show that the adjoint operator (deﬁned in the linear space of signed measures endowed
with the total variation norm) deﬁned by the transition function above has one and only one unique
ﬁxed point. This fact allows us to take limits in (3). This ﬁxed point corresponds to the invariant
measure of wage oﬀers λ, deﬁned in ([0,D],B[0,D]), which is the invariant measure we are looking for.
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A worker will have a wage oﬀer in a set C ⊂ A in data t+1 if either she already
has a wage w ∈ C and keeps it, or if she is unemployed, happens to receive a wage
oﬀer, and this wage oﬀer is in C. Formally, for C ⊂ A:
λt+1(C) = λt(C)(1 − θ) + λt(Ac)(1 − α)q(C)
Using (4) and (5), the invariant measure of wage is now given by:
λ(C) =
(1 − α)q(C)
θ + (1 − α)q(A)
(6)
The observed stationary distribution of wages in this model, λ∗, is a mixed
distribution in [0,D]. For , S ∈ B[0,D]:
λ∗(S) =

         
         
θ
θ+(1−α)q(A), if S = {0}
0, if S ⊂ [0, ¯ w]
(1−α)q(S)
θ+(1−α)q(A), if S ⊂ A
(7)
The average wage of all workers (including employed and unemployed workers)





θ + (1 − α)q(A(j))
(8)
where ¯ w(j) follows (2). As shown in Cysne (2004, 2006), wA is an increasing function
of the discount-factor parameter and, given (1), of j as well.
3. Income Inequality
The existence of diﬀerent discount factors between cohorts leads to a
between-cohort income inequality. The Proposition below provides an expression
for the Gini coeﬃcient as a function of the exogenous measure to be put into the
discount-factor parameters. Take a ∈ [0,1).
For use in Proposition 1, make equal to ¯ wA the average of the average wage in
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Proposition 1. The between-cohort Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality
associated with the problem outlined above is given by: 5










Proof. The Lorenz curve L(j) plots the percentage of total income earned by
the economic agents of a certain cohort, when these cohorts are ordered from
those with lower average income to those with higher average income. As shown
by Cysne (2004, 2006), there is an isomorphism linking the average wage wA to
the discount-factor parameter β (because w′
A(β) > 0). This fact implies that, by
ordering the population by βj we are, automatically, also ordering it by income, as
required in the construction of the Lorenz curve. Therefore, in this case the Lorenz







The Gini coeﬃcient by deﬁnition is equal to 1−2∗(area under the Lorenz curve),
the abcissa runing from 0 to 1. Therefore, taking into consideration the measure
m :




Note that above we are using the fact that the measure of cohorts with discount
factor equal or less than a certain constant a ∈ [0,1) is given by: P(βj ≤ a) =
P(H−1(j) ≤ a) = P(j ≤ H(a)) = H(a) = m([0,a]). This is also equivalent to the
measure of people with income less or equal than wA(βj).
(10) follows trivially from (11) and (12). ￿
4. Quantitative Assessments
This is as far as one can go without specifying the measures q (of wage oﬀers)
and m (of the distribution of discount factors among cohorts ). In order to get
some idea of the numbers generated by the analysis developed here, from now
on I will assume that measure q is the Lebesgue measure in [0,1] (this measure
allows for closed-form solutions to the reservation wage, the average wage, and the
Gini coeﬃcient), and that m has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure
given by the density of a Beta (114.5,1.01) distribution. The parameters of this
distribution have been chosen in order to make the (monthly) average equal to
114.5/(114.5 + 1.01) = 0.9913, which corresponds to an yearly average discount
factor of 0.900. Some numerical results are presented in the example below.
5 When a density φ(u) of measure m with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R is deﬁned,   βj
0
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Example 1 This example assumes that in each period the workers face a probability
θ of layoﬀ, a probability α of not ﬁnding a wage oﬀer and measures q and m,
speciﬁed as above. Using (2), (8), (9) and (10), the Gini coeﬃcient reads:
















































The values of the Gini coeﬃcients, for diﬀerent values of θ and α, are shown in





Alpha 0 0.1207 0.1049
0.2 0.1224 0.1049
Note in Table 1 that the between-cohort inequality decreases when the probability of
layoﬀ increases. An increase in θ has two eﬀects. First, it decreases the reservation
wages of all cohorts, thereby making it more likely that low wage oﬀers are taken by
workers in some cohorts. Second, having workers unemployed more frequently, the
average wages in all cohorts decrease, impoverishing all cohorts at the same time,
and decreasing inequality.
The sensibility of the income distribution to the probability of not ﬁnding a job
oﬀer each period, though, in the range of values of theta and alpha in which we
derived the results of Table 1, was of a diﬀerent sign and very small.
5. Conclusions
In this paper I have investigated income inequality among cohorts of homogenous
workers, when each cohort is characterized by a diﬀerent degree of impatience.
The work can be regarded as complementary to Pissarides’s (1974), who used a
job-search model to study within-cohort inequalities.
6 The absolute value of the numbers in Table 1, of course, vary according to how ﬁne the numerical
integration is carried out. The qualitative dependence of the Gini coeﬃcient on the parameter values
alpha and tetha, though, is not subject to this problem.
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Using the result obtained by Cysne (2004, 2006), that the average wage in
each cohort based on the invariant Markov measure is a decreasing function of
impatience, I have shown how to derive the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort
Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality. Next, I have provided an example, based
on arbitrary measures concerning the job oﬀers and the distribution of discount
factors among the diﬀerent cohorts. The example helps the to understand how the
parameter values aﬀect the Gini coeﬃcient, and gives an idea of the amount of
inequality that can be generated on account of discrepancies in discount factors
among groups of workers.
The numbers obtained indicate that the degree of inequality is decreasing in the
probability of unemployment and nondecreasing in the probability that unemployed
workers in each cohort do not ﬁnd job oﬀers each period. The probability of
unemployment has shown to have a greater impact over the generation of income
inequality than the probability of ﬁnding job oﬀers.
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